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Approaches that support the process of financial liberalization usually assume that free 
markets can ensure systemic adjustment in case of disequilibria without structural 
public interventions, and self-regulation mechanisms are more efficient than any 
collective regulatory mechanism. This article seeks to assess the irrelevance of these 
critical assumptions with regard to systemic viability in capitalist economies. These 
assumptions and related (de)regulatory (de)structural reforms implemented in the last 
decades reveal to be inconsistent with the characteristics of capitalist economies in light 
of the 2007-08 crisis. In the footsteps of Hyman Minsky, it maintains that financial 
instability and crises are endogenous phenomena in a capitalist economy and imply 
tight state intervention. It then argues that financial stability is a public matter and in 
order to reach societal efficiency and systemic viability, it is necessary to carry out a 
public organization of markets according to social/collective objectives beyond macro-
prudential regulatory mechanisms. 
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1. Introduction 
 
This article seeks to assess the irrelevance of the assumptions that support the financial 
liberalization with regard to the viability of monetary capitalist economies. It maintains, 
in the footsteps of Hyman Minsky, that financial instability and crises are endogenous 
phenomena in a capitalist economy and imply tight state intervention1. But it aims at 
going beyond the dominant after-crisis fashion that contemplates Obscure Economist’s 
financial instability analysis in time of tumult à la Wall Street Journal (Lahart, 2007). It 
then argues that in order to reach societal2 efficiency and ensure systemic viability, it is 
necessary to carry out a public organization of markets according to social/collective 
objectives beyond macro-prudential regulatory mechanisms.  
Economists usually assert that the well-known textbook economic theory of (perfectly 
competitive) market equilibrium is a good proxy for understanding the functioning of a 
capitalist economy. They maintain that price-oriented free market mechanisms would 
lead to an efficient social outcome, also called the full-employment economic 
equilibrium. Therefore, the role of the state should be limited to some (non-Leviathan 
but regalian) market-friendly incentives-enhancing missions, such as the protection of 
property, after-crisis recovery interventions (if necessary), self-control reinforcing 
regulation, etc. G. Akerlof and R. Shiller (2009, xi) note that this approach was passed 
from the economists to the think tankers, policy elites, and public intellectuals, and 
finally to the mass media. It became a political mantra:  
                                                            
1 I prefer to use of the term “crisis” instead of “disequilibrium” because in a relevant alternative approach, 
the working of a monetary capitalist market economy (assumed to rest on the ethical principle of 
methodological individualism and on the efficiency of selfish private strategies) cannot result in systemic 
compatibility of decentralized decisions (except by low probabilistic magic). Consequently, 
“disequilibrium” must be reserved to the models of general or partial real equilibrium that assume 
implicitly or explicitly that the expected result - equilibrium - is already reached before the 
implementation of decentralized individual strategies as it is usually the case in standard economic 
models, including the so-called DSGE studies. In fact, the only way to be able to talk about disequilibrium 
is to assume that equilibrium (or multiple equilibria) could exist as a rule in decentralized markets and 
this should give the reference point for all economic reflexion. Thus it would be more appropriate to use 
the term of “viability” (Ülgen, 2013b) in the analysis of a capitalist economic society. Viability can be 
defined as the capacity/ability of an economic system to deal with systemic crisis situations without being 
obliged to call its major principles, rules and values into question (Ülgen, 2013a). 
2
 Although “social” and “societal” are almost synonymous, “societal” relies more on the whole society 
while “social” may be used to designate also inter-individuals or individuals-society relations. In this 
sense, I use the adjective “societal” for societal efficiency (and not “social efficiency”) to be distinguished 
from individual economic efficiency. 
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“I am a believer in free markets”. The belief that government should not interfere 
with people in pursuit of their own self-interest has influenced national policies 
across the globe. (…) as Keynes’ legacy and the role of government have been 
challenged, the system of safeguards developed from the experience of the Great 
Depression has been eroded.”  
Therefore the (liberal) belief that unregulated free markets are the best way to 
guarantee economic efficiency and social welfare has gained strength and a “New 
Consensual Theory” (NCT) has become the basic reference of economic and financial 
(de)regulatory reforms everywhere in the world since the 1980s.  
Indeed, after recurrent crises in developing but also in developed economies during the 
1990s and 2000s, a re-arranged approach – called the “New Monetary Consensus” by R. 
Wray (2004) and the “New Consensus Macroeconomics” by P. Arestis (2009) - came into 
the picture. I call it hereafter the “New Consensual Theory” (NCT) which is a mix of New 
Classical and New Keynesian theories that results in an opportunistic agglomeration of 
the traditional Neo Classical model (the standardized partial equilibrium model of a 
market economy), the New Classical school (Application of Rational Expectations to the 
Economic Policy), the Real Business Cycle approach (economic disequilibria mainly 
coming from exogenous technological shocks and private agents’ rational (voluntary) 
responses to such shocks) and the New Keynesian economics (multiple equilibria and 
DSGE models). This agglomeration aims at facing major theoretical and empirical critics 
about the inconsistency of decentralized markets’ spontaneous equilibrium hypothesis 
and replaces the New neoclassical Synthesis of M. Goodfriend and R. King (1997) that 
had made official the “end of debates in the economics” and gave the Washington 
Consensus its academic recognition3. But this new consensus is not so new since it 
remains a non-monetary approach such as money and financial variables do not play 
any core role in economic evolution. It is also worth noting that this NCT is closely 
related to the paradigm of Free Markets Efficiency (FME).  
Two critical assumptions of this agglomerated approach support the process of financial 
liberalization. First, free markets are assumed to ensure systemic adjustment in case of 
disequilibria without structural restrictive public interventions. And second, 
private/decentralized self-regulation mechanisms are supposed to be more efficient 
                                                            
3 For a peculiar synthesis of such an evolution, see Woodford (2008). 
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than any collective regulatory mechanism. Those hypotheses reveal to be inconsistent 
with the characteristics of capitalist economies since the ongoing worldwide crisis casts 
doubt about the relevance of liberal policies and related (de)regulatory (de)structural 
reforms implemented in the last decades.  
As J. Kregel (2009) maintains, the right diagnosis is more important than the cure that 
might be implemented in face of the systemic crisis. Unfortunately, the 2007-08 crisis 
did not permit the economic profession to leave its dominant beliefs and to adopt a 
more scientific stance in the analysis of market economies. The worst thing about it is 
that in spite of all one might have said to point to the systemic weaknesses and logic 
irrelevances of liberal finance and related theories and policies, doctrinal believers and 
their policy-maker followers paid scant regard to what have been suggested as 
alternative recovery ways to replace ill-fitted regulatory schemas. As a rule of thumb, for 
several decades, such a political choice has repeatedly resulted in more destabilized 
capitalism and large worrying crises all around the world. 
To deal with this enduring issue, the second section reminds the doctrinal roots of 
financial liberalization that mainly rests on NCT-FME and shows that this results in a 
financialized economy. This leads to a new speculative regime of accumulation that is 
fuelled by continuous but unsustainable bubbles and hampers real growth. 
The third section asserts, in a Minskyian tradition, that - given the structural 
characteristics of capitalism - financial instability is an endogenous phenomenon which 
is intensified by the process of financial liberalization. To develop such an assertion, it is 
argued that capitalism is a private-decision/expectation-based monetary economy 
which relies on debt relations. Viability of the accumulation process then lies in the 
systemic possibility to validate the debt structure by the realization of expected profits. 
However, in such a non-ergodic economy which evolves through growing 
interdependences, fallacy of composition and cognitive dissonance, there is no 
guarantee to validate the societal compatibility of separate decisions/actions.  
Therefore, the fourth section sheds light on an elementary truth: the working of 
capitalism requires collective rules and mechanisms that must aim to organize and guide 
private actors’ strategies with respect to systemic viability. It then maintains that 
system-wide threats requires an enforceable system-wide regulation since individuals’ 
capacities are limited to their own interests and micro knowledge, and macro stability is 
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beyond their capacity. Such regulation is obviously related to two principles. First, 
monetary/financial stability has a peculiar status as a kind of specific collective good as 
it concerns the whole society and its viability conditions. And second, 
monetary/financial stability cannot be produced and consumed according to self-
regulation models but calls for public intervention that must play the role of referee and 
stand outside of the private market relations in order to organize, supervise and 
regulate capitalist monetary and financial system. Those propositions result in an open-
minded 5-S efficiency paradigm that could replace the free markets efficiency belief. The 
last section concludes through a few basic implications and recommendations. 
2. Efficiency, ergodic world and economists’ tale: liberalization of capitalist 
finance and growth-hampering accumulation regime 
The process of financial liberalization results in a new financialized accumulation regime 
that blocks real growth. This systemic transformation is related to a doctrinal and 
political will supported by the NCT-FME paradigm. F. Ülgen (2010) notes that the design 
of monetary and financial systems is determined following this paradigm, and, from the 
1970s, regulatory models have been changed into private self-assessment schemas and 
allowed economic agents to adopt globally unconstrained market strategies. Free 
markets are assumed to provide economies with the best way to produce/consume as 
well as to resolve any possible disequilibrium as market prices are supposed to give 
fairly well4 required information about assets’ values and then make separate individual 
decisions globally compatible with each other5. Monetary and financial systems are 
regarded as technical details related to real equilibrium exchanges. Thus there is no 
room for specific analysis of sophisticated financial structures and related insolvency 
and illiquidity concerns that a capitalist economy can generate in its own evolution. The 
underlying hypothesis of complete markets indeed makes that instability is only 
conceivable under the (ad hoc) hypothesis of exogenous shocks (usually deemed to be 
minor frictions at systemic level)6. This hypothesis assumes an ergodic world which 
                                                            
4
 at least better than any other social system. 
5
 For a detailed analysis of Fama-like hypotheses and models on FME, see Ülgen, 2011. 
6 Instability is regarded as an exogenous phenomenon mainly coming from policy errors or from 
institutional weaknesses. In this approach an institutional weakness means that market institutions are 
not good (complete/perfect) enough to allow private agents to undertake efficient profit-seeking 
activities. Therefore, improving institutions means structural transformations of society through better 
private property protection, externality reducing legislation, more open international competition and 
reduction of legal constraints over private initiatives. There is no room for elaboration and 
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leads to the blind faith in the efficiency of markets and in the relevance of liberal 
economic policies. Then P. Davidson (2012: 59) remarks that:  
“This ergodic axiom assumes the economic future is already predetermined. The 
economy is governed by an existing ergodic stochastic process. One merely has to 
calculate probability distributions regarding future prices and output to draw 
significant and reliable statistical inferences [information] about the future. Once 
self-interested decision makers have reliable information about the future, their 
actions on free markets will optimally allocate resources into those activities that 
will have the highest possible future returns thereby assuring global prosperity.”  
Such a hypothetical world of NCT-FME results in the assertion that self-regulation -
without exogenous constraints and interventions - is better than any mechanism of 
public/societal regulation to guarantee systemic (macro) stability. The necessary 
institutional framework rests on market-friendly “good institutions” and incentives 
since market mechanisms’ self-adjustment capacity could insure the resilience of 
economies against exogenous shocks. One may conclude from this that as prudential 
intervention would generate further constraints and costs on banking/financial 
activities, limit the freedom of action and reduce the efficiency of the resource allocation 
process it might be counterproductive. As stated in Ülgen (2015), several eminent 
authors maintain that detailed rules and restrictive standards are both burdensome and 
ineffective, but also counterproductive with regard to systemic stability (Barth et al. 
2006). In this vein, A. Greenspan (1997) asserts that the consistent regulatory rule is to 
allow the private sector to put in place effective risk management systems letting 
markets foster financial innovation and reinforce accountability, compliance and 
disclosure of information.  
The recommendations of the Basel Committee, from 1988 with Basel I’s Cooke ratio, 
through 2004 Basel II’s McDonough ratio, till today’s after-2007 crisis Basel III’s 
regulatory “reforms”, encourage prudential arbitraging of financial actors and various 
internal rating procedures such as Internal Rating Based (IRB) and Rating Agencies’ 
regular announcements about the soundness of banks, financial intermediaries 
(including rating agencies!) and innovated products and processes. Macro-prudential 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
implementation of common objectives to improve social welfare through collective actions and 
organization since any collective/common objective and organization is suspected of being an anti-
market/anti-freedom (and inefficient) mechanism.  
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supervision schemas, relying mainly on public authorities, are replaced by the 
mechanisms of micro-prudential regulation. The Independent Evaluation Office of the 
International Monetary Fund (IEO, 2011) states that:  
“The prevailing view among IMF staff -a cohesive group of macroeconomists- was 
that market discipline and self-regulation would be sufficient to stave off serious 
problems in financial institutions. They also believed that crises were unlikely to 
happen in advanced economies, where “sophisticated” financial markets could 
thrive safely with minimal regulation of a large and growing portion of the 
financial system.”  
Through such an environment a new economy emerges and mainly rests on short-
sighted efficiency of engagements in deregulated markets. Financial innovations - 
permitted by loose regulatory principles - push individual decisions towards more 
speculative activities and support wrong beliefs about the sustainability of liberalized 
and financialized economies. New speculation-oriented financial products and processes 
fuel the new regime of (financial) accumulation related to the expected price rise of 
assets and transform financing relations into Ponzi structures à la Minsky. In the period 
before the 2007/08 crisis, the economy turns out to be a bubble environment based on 
real-estate-related debt leveraging in search of rapid capital gains:  
“The annual rise in land prices has far outstripped growth in national income 
since the late 1960s, becoming the driving force in today’s financialized mode of 
“wealth creation” ” (Hudson, 2010: 4).  
This evolution of capitalism is quite continuous since the 1970s. It rests on deeply 
financialized profit-seeking activities that rely on the profitability of growing debt 
burden and inflating financial markets without any corresponding sustainable real 
growth. The regime of accumulation moves towards more short-term criteria, and 
financial operations7 become the main helm of both economic decisions and public 
policies (Ülgen, 2013a). “Innovated banking” permits to finance large Leveraged Buy 
Outs (LBOs), takeovers and mergers in markets. Parallel to this, governments’ deficits 
are financed in markets and accompany speculative growth all around the world. The 
                                                            
7
 New products and processes such as mortgage-backed securities, MBSs, Special Purpose Vehicles, SPVs, 
etc. directed towards speculative opportunities. For a detailed presentation, see Ülgen, 2010, 2011; Wray, 
2012. 
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price-stability or inflation-targeting monetary policy leads to a generalized wage-
deflation process, accompanied in the US by a sustained consumption thanks to low 
levels of interest rates and lax credit system that allows economic actors (including 
households) to spend more and more without regular income growing. Fernandez, 
Kaboub and Todorova (2008: 8-9) note that between 1980 and 2004, wage income 
hardly changed in the US while worker productivity was increasing by 68% and the Gini 
coefficient has been rising with a widening gap between the bottom and second quintiles 
and the top 20%. 
When regular incomes do not increase, the only possibility to include large popular 
masses into the new accumulation regime is the easy (subprime) loans policy. Thus, the 
new accumulation schema (using a new speculative tool, the house industry through 
new mortgage techniques) is allowed by the rise in homeownership since 2001, after the 
end of the dotcom bubble. The spending-ease optimism generates confident 
expectations on continuously rising profits that increase the willingness to assume less 
sound liability structures. This speculative environment reinforces the willingness of 
lenders to accept low-yield assets regarding the lenders’ risk as it was also noted in the 
1980s by Minsky (1982: 122 and 282). A kind of attractive bubble and large optimism 
emerge over time and the euphoria generates pervasive transformations in portfolios 
the liquidity level of which subsequently decreases:  
“growth over the past few decades has been driven largely by rising household 
spending on consumption and residential investment. Consumption as a percent 
of GDP was 63% in 1980, 67% in 1998 and 70% in 2008. Since real wages were 
stagnant and real family income growth was slow, rising household spending was 
increasingly driven by the combined effects of rising debt and the increase in 
household wealth created by stock market and housing booms” (Crotty, 2009: 
576)8.  
It is obvious that the financing of households’ debt positions can only be continuous if 
the expected value of the real estate assets is growing enough in order to permit 
households to reimburse their debts, i.e. when the expected value of houses is at least as 
high as the commitments necessitate:  
                                                            
8 As reported by Crotty (2009), household debt was 48% of GDP in 1985, about where it had been in 1965. 
But it grew to 66% by 1998 then accelerated to over 100% by late 2008. 
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“In an ordinary home mortgage the primary source of the cash needed to fulfil the 
contract is the income of the homeowner. The secondary source or fallback 
source of cash is the market value of the mortgaged property” (Minsky, 1982: 19-
20).  
In the development of mortgage-backed financial relations, the primary source of the 
real estate industry (homeowners’ regular income) was dethroned by the secondary 
source as the expansion of the market was founded on speculative expectations on the 
future market value of properties. As the evolution of this market value is related to 
bubbles’ boom, banks and other financial intermediaries did not take care of the 
multiplication of commitments which fuelled bubbles. But such a financial system is 
naturally reckless and fragile9. Minsky shows that many of the real estate investment 
trusts that came upon hard times in 1974-75 in the US were, quite unknown to the 
household investors who bought their equities, involved in Ponzi schemes:  
“Many of these trusts were financing construction projects that had to be sold out 
quickly and at a favorable price if the debts to the trusts were to be paid. A 
tightening of mortgage credit brought on slowness of sales of finished 
construction, which led to a “present value reversal” for these projects” (1982: 
106).  
The instability is closely dependent on this reversal of the present value of real estate 
assets. As Minsky (1982: 30) remarks “Consumer and mortgage debt can become Ponzi-
like only if actual wage income falls short of anticipated and other sources of disposal 
income”. But this instable evolution of capitalist finance is not an exceptional 
phenomenon and it is regularly generated by the normal working of the economic 
system. 
                                                            
9 Links between the 2007/08 crisis and the new accumulation regime’s characteristics can be observed 
through two phenomena in the 2000s. First, households re-leveraged excessively rising consumption 
through increasing debt burdens and over-borrowing. This increase was supported by rising asset prices 
(housing and also equity). These new Ponzi-like borrowers and their funders were rested their expansion 
on negative amortisation mortgages. At the beginning, they were usual speculative borrowers who 
expected to be able to refinance their mortgages and debts in time thanks to the expected increase of 
market values of their assets. Second, at the same time loose credit standards among mortgage lenders 
reinforced the current credit cycle. This process spread to the corporate and financial system through the 
switch from equity to debt that took the form of LBOs that sustained the private equity and swelled the 
bulk of the equity market bubble. The optimism of lenders and borrowers is also driven by the growth in 
liquidity from hedge fund and private equity, feeding hot money funds. The fragile borrowers were able to 
obtain refinancing thanks to easy (speculative) credit on bubbly markets. The environment was then 
dominated by NINJA (no income, no job, no assets) relations. 
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3. Endogenous instability of financialized capitalism: some elements of proof 
Instability is the inability of the financial system to face accumulated risks as those risks 
grow beyond the resilience of debt commitments regarding the bulk of imbalances. Such 
a definition focuses on the financial system as a whole, as opposed to micro-prudential 
approach-based analysis of risks. Financial instability then comes from the winding 
build-up of systemic fragilities often associated with aggressive risk-taking. Minsky 
(1986: 327) states that “financial instability is normal in capitalist economy; the tranquil 
era between 1946 and 1966 was an anomaly”.  
Actually, capitalism is a monetary economy in which private/decentralized decision-
dependent economic activity relies on debt relations that involve bank credit and 
financial intermediation. The debt-financing process depends on private units’ 
expectations about the future (but uncertain) profits. So the viability of the capitalist 
accumulation process lies in the systemic possibility to validate the debt structure by the 
realization of expected profits. However, in such a non-ergodic economy there is no 
guarantee to validate the societal compatibility of separate decisions/actions. Hence, the 
working of the economy requires some collective rules and mechanisms to organize and 
guide private actors’ strategies with respect to systemic viability. 
Those general characteristics of capitalism make Minskyian and (Post) Keynesian 
analytical arguments relevant to understand the evolution of financialized economies 
and recurrent instabilities. Ülgen (2014a: 577) specifies three major features in such 
economies: 1) They are monetary economies in which financial relations (rules, 
mechanisms and markets) play a central and crucial role; 2) They are complex societies 
that require specific institutions such that their evolution relies on the consistency of 
institutional patterns that shape (private/public) actors’ behavior and determine 
systemic stability; 3) Those conditions are mainly macro-concerns and cannot rest on 
micro-regulatory mechanisms relating on private objectives. 
Therefore, as maintained by several progressive economists (Palley, 2009; Kregel, 2010; 
Wray, 2012, to name but a few), an alternative analytical approach, the Financial 
Instability Hypothesis (FIH) of Minsky, becomes relevant to understand the pitfalls of 
the liberal finance and to suggest some lines of reforms to prevent (at least to reduce) 
systemic welfare-destroying crises. Minsky (1992: 2) explicitly defines his FIH with 
regard to the characteristics of capitalism:  
12 
 
“The theoretical argument of the financial instability hypothesis starts from the 
characterization of the economy as a capitalist economy with expensive capital 
assets and a complex, sophisticated financial system. The economic problem is 
identified following Keynes as the “capital development of the economy,” rather 
than the Knightian “allocation of given resources among alternative 
employments.” The focus is on an accumulating capitalist economy that moves 
through real calendar time. The capital development of a capitalist economy is 
accompanied by exchanges of present money for future money. The present 
money pays for resources that go into the production of investment output, 
whereas the future money is the “profits” which will accrue to the capital asset 
owning firms (as the capital assets are used in production). As a result of the 
process by which investment is financed, the control over items in the capital 
stock by producing units is financed by liabilities - these are commitments to pay 
money at dates specified or as conditions arise.” 
In contrast to the liberal consensus about the self-adjusting nature of free markets, the 
FIH “can be seen as an alternative to the notion of efficient markets” (Whalen, 2012: 12) 
as it shows that bubbles and crises are endogenous features of capitalism. Minsky 
(1986) announces the fundamental propositions of the FIH through two systemic 
characteristics: capitalist market mechanisms cannot lead to a sustained, stable-price, 
full-employment equilibrium, and serious business cycles are due to the financial 
attributes that are essential to capitalism. Minsky (1982: 66) then states that capitalism, 
as a private debt-financing economy, is naturally instable:  
“Stable growth is inconsistent with the manner in which investment is 
determined in an economy in which debt-financed ownership of capital exists, 
and the extent to which such debt financing can be carried is market determined. 
It follows that the fundamental instability of a capitalist economy is upward. The 
tendency to transform doing well into a speculative investment boom is the basic 
instability in a capitalist economy.” 
From this perspective, the FIH assumes that financial instabilities are prepared during 
the periods of generalized euphoria in markets. A relevant QED (quod erat 
demonstrandum) for capitalist endogenous instability can be suggested through some 
13 
 
particular elements of the dynamics of euphoria and related supportive liberal policies 
that extended the life of the neoliberal model (Palley, 2010).  
The first is the confusion between two opposed and (must-be) separated activities: to 
rate and to be rated (to judge and to be judged). The new regulatory environment aided 
and abetted the decline of the stability of banks and financial systems (Kregel, 2010) as 
it led to the increasing importance of rating agencies in the evaluation of the soundness 
and stability of banks and other financial intermediaries. This means that two 
contradictory activities coexist within these agencies: activity of advice and activity of 
rating. The elaboration of various categories of credit and their evaluation rely on the 
permanent intervention of agencies as technical advisers of banks. The assessment of 
the soundness of private institutions and specifically the disclosure of related 
information, which may be regarded as public goods, become dependent on private 
activity and interests of rating agencies. Those agencies are, indeed, both advisers in 
various financial set-ups of banks and financial intermediaries (especially for various 
structured credit vehicles) and evaluators of the quality of the same products, which 
obviously provokes conflict of interests. Large vested interests then determine actors’ 
strategies since regulatory mechanisms become more and more dependent on agencies’ 
ratings; banks, financial firms and their products to be rated are their core business!10 
Furthermore, private rating usually generates pro-cyclical movement by feeding 
financial growth during the periods of boom and by abruptly stopping asset price 
evolution during the periods of distress (Sy, 2009). Consequently, rating agencies do not 
(cannot, as a matter of logic) play a stabilizing role against the formation of systemic 
bubbles.  
Second, private actors and decentralized markets are continuously and genetically 
evolving through a specific phenomenon: the macular degeneration. In a liberalized and 
self-regulation based environment, private actors as well as regulators implement 
strategies to extend the period of expansion of short-term speculative positions. In such 
an environment, actors are unable to regard the evolution beyond the peripheral 
opportunities they can immediately perceive. Their expectations and behavior then 
become blind to disaster (Orléan, 2009). The policymakers also are under this tendency 
                                                            
10 US SEC already questioned the risks inherent to the current mechanisms further to Enron and 
WorldCom scandals and underlined conflicts of interests (Securities and Exchange Commission, 2003). 
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(O’Hara, 2007; Palley, 2009) fuelled by cognitive dissonance (Akerlof, 2005). Indeed, in 
case of distress stemming from different contradictory information, individuals prefer 
trust in information that seems to them more suitable with regard their preferred 
desires. This means that people can manipulate their own beliefs by selecting sources of 
information likely to confirm “desired” beliefs11. When economic actors convince 
themselves that their decisions are relevant, they potentially make judgment errors due 
to the divergence between their beliefs and the true state of the world. We find again the 
opposition between the ergodic and the non ergodic, between uncertainty and certainty, 
between a market economy working on the model of decentralized monetary capitalism 
and a collective-planned economy working on the model of societal organization for 
social aims and objectives towards sustainable desired and directed changes.  
Minsky (1991) underlines the fragile posture of micro-rationality as the working of 
markets rests on the subjective transformation of uncertainty into some probabilistic 
risk assessment calculations which ignore the true nature of the world. Keynes (1936: 
153-154) remarks that the mass psychology allows individuals to enter into heroic but 
fragile positions on financial markets where precarious day-to-day fluctuations “tend to 
have an altogether excessive, and even an absurd, influence on the market”. 
It is obvious that at individual (microeconomic) level the true state of the world (e.g., the 
systemic macro situation) cannot be observed but a posteriori. This makes a crucial 
difference between micro-rationality and macro-stability. Related to this, our third 
analytical element is the fallacy of composition that points to the confusion between 
micro-rationality and macro-consistency of economic decisions. The decentralized 
monetary capitalist economy works under this fallacy such that the combination of 
individually rational (and/or efficient) decisions does not give an optimal economic 
system:  
                                                            
11 Indeed, the preparation of the crisis reveals a very positive evaluation of asset prices in markets which 
rests on an implicit agreement (convention) that dictates actors’ decisions. As long as markets believe that 
the potential of rising valuation of assets and activities is not yet reached, expectations about the future 
remain optimistic and continue to feed increasing speculative positions. Consequently, enterprises 
continue their debt-financing and debt-repayment strategies through LBOs while banks and financial 
intermediaries feed the production and circulation of very flexible and no capital requiring products 
(derivatives, options and futures) to make continuous financing of such operations possible. Markets 
remain confident as they expect further speculative gains with voracious appetite even though some 
warning indicators reach some critical levels. Actors believe that a possible crisis will occur only later and 
prefer to take positions with high expected yields and not to miss opportunities offered by the positive 
faiths on the future of markets. They are then totally blind to disaster however close it may be. 
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“the fallacy of composition brings it about from time to time that individual actors 
all act rationally but in combination produce an irrational result, such as standing 
to get a better view as spectators of sport or, more dramatically, running for the 
exit in a theater fire” (Kindleberger, 1989: 243).  
In case of distress, markets clear by rationing and this worsens information about 
borrowers and then implies more deterioration of monetary and financial relations. 
Decentralized individual decisions not only contribute to the accumulation of systemic 
fragilities but they are also pyromaniac in face of distress. Strategic individual reaction 
against risks - though useful during the periods of moderate fluctuations in markets – is 
ineffective during the periods of distress since dominant speculative profit-seeking 
short-term behavior increases pressures to sell assets and fuels pro-cyclic volatility of 
markets. So the liberal regulatory schema ignores the fallacy of composition and does 
then confuse micro-prudential regulation with macro-prudential supervision. In other 
words, individual efficiency of micro-rational decisions and societal efficiency of the 
whole economic system do not mean the same thing. Applied to financial markets, this 
means that the microeconomic-individual safety of establishments or products does not 
guarantee a sound and stable financial system12.  
Micro-prudential regulation only regards individual positons and capacities to deal with 
foreseeable risks at their own micro level. They cannot think about endogenous risks 
since this type of risk cannot be integrated into equilibrium and money-neutral models! 
Also, by composition, they cannot deal with the implications of linkages among 
individuals, between individuals and systemic dynamics and with the limits of individual 
actors’ capacity to face the consequences of macro imbalances.  
The fourth proof to be put to the fore in this analysis is the strong interconnectedness 
(direct/indirect linkages) among actors and markets that cannot be dealt with by 
separate actors and markets themselves. The interconnectedness is eminently a 
macroeconomic concern while the self-regulation is only based on individual evaluation 
and capacity. Through various and multiple contractual obligations, banks in the 
                                                            
12
 Indeed, when an establishment perceives an increase of risks related to its commitments, its rational 
behavior would usually consist in reducing its exposure by undoing its engagements. This individually 
rational behavior, when it is widened to a large number of establishments, provokes a crisis of illiquidity. 
In case of panic it may also generate systemic insolvency since agents would take position on the same 
side of the market in order to protect themselves against generalized insolvency. 
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interbank (money) market and financial intermediaries in financial markets (through 
the issue of various assets and financing operations), become exposed to one another 
and are closely related to financial contagion and spillovers. Highly liberalized financial 
environment allows banks to undertake various innovations through monetary and 
financial networks that create strong linkages and interdependences among different 
actors. Therefore, individuals’ decisions and actions (microeconomic behavior) may 
generate multilateral and multi-level effects such as in period of uncontrollable 
disturbances, chain reactions in numerous markets may suddenly occur independently 
of previous expectations. This implies a specific analysis of the formation of modern 
financial systems as a complex network structure to understand contagion phenomena 
and direct and indirect channels of crisis transmission (Hale, Kapan and Minoiu, 2013). 
The interpenetration and the deep links between different economies and firms make 
that the weight of idiosyncratic risks on systemic stability becomes decisive and the 
interconnections gain strength in the explanation of worldwide financial disequilibria. 
However, the lack of long-term macroeconomic vision makes the mechanisms of market 
coordination unable to be positively reactive in case of stress as they do not take into 
account the conditions of global viability of monetary systems. In this line, it seems to be 
possible to point to some regulatory implications for systemic stability through the 
opposition between self-regulation and public macro-prudential supervision.  
4. New relevant regulatory design 
There is no other domain in capitalism that calls for socially guided and controlled 
institutions than money and finance (Ülgen, 2014a). This is related to the peculiar 
nature of money which is transversal because all economic transactions rely on 
monetary relations:  
“Monetary and financial problems do structurally matter to all other sectors 
through the changes of strategies of the credit-money providers (banks) and of 
financial intermediaries. Hence, changes on money/financial markets affect the 
whole economy irrespective of decision units which are or are not involved in 
debt relations” (Ülgen, 2014b: 263).  
Money is also ambivalent as it has a twofold nature that lies both in private decisions 
and public rules. Its creation lies in private decisions of banks and entrepreneurs based 
on profit expectations. At the same time, its general use and validity as a means of 
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payment and of general settlement depends on non‑individual, public rules (Ülgen, 
2013b). From this perspective, money is a social institution, a set of social rules that 
allow private economic units to undertake decentralized debt-based activities. Such 
debts circulate as money through the entire economy and thus involve the entire society. 
Therefore, the stability of monetary and financial relations determines systemic viability 
conditions, and requires collectively designed public regulation:  
“The fulfillment of the function of money is founded on a structure of normative 
and constitutive rules that support currency and regulate the behavior of its 
users. Political authority constitutes and enforces these rules, safeguarding at the 
same time the collective intentionality of its subjects. The identity of money 
should be understood in terms of these rules and consequently money should be 
defined as an institution” (Papadopoulos 2009: 967). 
Regulation and regulatory institutions frame the economic integration process of the 
entire society. The private-interest based regulation, the well-known neoclassical 
incentives system, argues that constrained regulation and hands-on influence over 
financial systems cannot enhance financial soundness. It maintains that supervision 
mechanisms must encourage private monitoring of banks through sound contract 
enforcement systems. In case of fire, central banks and governments must intervene to 
calm down manic behavior. However, as the diagnosis of the crisis is not robust in this 
kind approach that fundamentally rests on the belief of well-working of free markets, 
the cure is not sustainable. As analyzed in Kregel (2009) and Wray (2012), the 2007-08 
crisis is seen as a temporary liquidity crisis and central banks intervened through 
quantitative easing programs without regarding the structural weaknesses of liberalized 
speculation-oriented financial systems. Several years after their interventions and 
amazing amounts of money placed in rescue operations, capitalist finance still remains 
highly fragile and crisis-prone. In his study of some threats of financial crisis occurred in 
the post-war period, Minsky (1982) wisely argues that the central bank should use its 
monetary powers to guide the evolution of financial markets in directions that are 
compatible with financial stability in the longer run rather than improvise controls that 
put out fires but which allow the underlying market situation to remain unchanged.   
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In this vein, the alternative approach puts the emphasis on the failures of markets and 
neoclassical incentive mechanisms to deal with macro-stability concerns and advocates 
for powerful public regulatory and supervision agencies to directly monitor and 
discipline banks and financial institutions in order to improve macro stability and 
strengthen systemic viability. It maintains that the stability of the financial system is a 
public good which must be produced and managed through macro-regulatory 
frameworks. From this perspective, Minsky’s FIH is relevant to understand capitalist 
evolution and then to suggest relevant alternative regulatory framework. 
It is worth noting that systemic problems are the cumulative results of individual actions 
that imply collective actions since individuals’ capacities are limited to their own 
interests and micro knowledge. As systemic problems resolution generates social 
advantages which are superior to private advantages and as every private individual 
unit would benefit from the resolution of such problems even if she/he does not 
contribute to any effort by her/himself, the reduction of system-wide threats requires an 
enforceable system-wide regulation. Such regulation is obviously related to two 
principles. First, monetary/financial stability has a peculiar status as a kind of specific 
collective good as it concerns the whole society and its viability conditions. And second, 
monetary/financial stability cannot be “produced/consumed” according to 
decentralized and anonymous market mechanisms but calls for public intervention that 
must play the role of referee and stand outside of the private market relations in order 
to organize, supervise and regulate capitalist monetary and financial system. 
The endogenous nature of financial instability in capitalist economies makes relevant 
the policies that aim at sustaining domestic economic activity and the central banks that 
act as social organizers of financial markets. Such an alternative approach especially 
rests on the key role of public institutions in economic development. Beyond the crucial 
role of central banks as lenders of last resorts in case of systemic distress and as 
providers of valuable information about the evolution of markets, economic policies and 
societies through interest rates changes, public authorities must aim at organizing 
monetary and financial systems in an alternative way and leave the liberal ideological 
blindness to disaster. This alternative consists in organizing and framing market 
economies through the visible hand of the public power. It calls for more rigorous bank 
supervision and tighter regulation of financial markets that must be designed and 
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implemented at the systemic and global level in coherence with the core characteristics 
of monetary capitalist economies.  
With regard to those assertions, one may wonder how can the lost reputation in the 
economics be regained after several decades of worldwide disasters? First, one should 
begin by abandoning the wrong, doctrinal, unscientific neoliberal beliefs of socially and 
economically efficient free markets and selfish individual strategies. Second, if one 
would continue to live in a free enterprise society, one should sustain societal efficiency-
seeking public interventions aiming at making decentralized individual decisions and 
actions socially consistent according to collective objectives: 
“Re-regulation cannot therefore lie in some improved control devices of actors’ 
behaviour in a liberal environment. It must be founded on alternative principles 
to cut financial markets’ ardour down and push them to adopt less speculative 
strategies. That means, at least, the prevention of speculative positions through 
new regulatory rules, for instance by separating the financial intermediation and 
the traditional – productive system financing – bank activities. ‘Finance to 
finance’ and ‘finance to produce’ must be distinguished”. (Ülgen, 2014b: 272-273) 
Those objectives must then be designed and discussed through some common directions 
and consensus and not rest on the market (economic) efficiency criterion. This latter 
could be replaced by the open-minded 5-S efficiency paradigm13 that points to systemic 
stability and viability concerns:  
1. Sage efficiency: rules, policies and measures/incentives must be judicious, prudent 
and acceptable with regard to the common objectives at philosophical as well as at 
political level;  
2. Sailing efficiency: the design and the implementation of rules, policies and 
measures/incentives must be organized and directed transparently and with large 
participation from different social stakeholders. The governance of the society must be 
as democratic and open as possible and appear to be supra individuals, beyond local and 
group interests. In this case, errors and poor results can be discussed and corrected 
together whatever the responsibilities of the policymakers involved in the process; 
                                                            
13 This paradigm aims at contributing to the debate about the reorganization/re-conception of economic 
society. It is not limited and can (must) be developed to include different aspects of social life in order to 
reach higher levels of development and wellbeing. 
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3. Societal efficiency: rules, policies and measures/incentives must aim at ensuring and 
improving the welfare and wellbeing of citizens in the entire society;  
4. Stability efficiency: stability must be understood in a more general sense, e.g. 
macroeconomic stability, political stability, cohesive and inclusive stability;  
5. Structural efficiency: rules, policies and measures/incentives must aim at 
strengthening society’s foundations and cohesion among citizens through common 
objectives, rights and duties. Organization of markets must prevent free rider behavior 
and out of control strategies from financial institutions. 
This paradigm is fed by various heterodox approaches such as Post Keynesian theories, 
evolutionary models and institutional economics. Groenewegen and Van der Steen 
(2007) maintain that contrary to traditional mainstream economics which claims a role 
for government only in the case of market failures, (Original) Institutional Economics 
explicitly gives government an interventionist role as a developer of industrial and 
technology policies. Following this, the emphasis must be put on the role of government 
as a developer of financial regulatory structure of monetary economies. This role is a 
crucial one as money and financial structure is the cornerstone of capitalism. 
Concluding implications 
This article argued that self-regulation rests on partial and subjective microeconomic 
criteria of individual units and cannot cope with systemic viability of monetary capitalist 
economies. More explicitly, NCT-FME models cannot consider, by definition, problems 
lying in the very characteristics of modern economies. Self-regulation paradigm entrusts 
market mechanisms with the care of correcting possible failures of market mechanisms 
themselves! Such a mode of regulation results in a highly liberalized and financialized 
economy that leads to a new speculation-based growth hampering accumulation regime. 
However, the sustainability of such a regime is extremely fragile because of the absence 
of long-term macroeconomic vision and the lack of consideration of the 
interconnectedness among private actors. These latters continuously suffer from 
macular degeneration while the economy they form evolves through the fallacy of 
composition. Hence, individual actors cannot take into account systemic instability 
concerns. By definition, these concerns are beyond their capacity and will and must be 
addressed towards collective rules and principles. 
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Therefore, two major features that characterize the liberal finance have to be ended in 
order to make capitalist economy a bit viable: the domination of self-regulation over the 
prudential public supervision of financial system and the domination of the micro-
prudential approach over any macro-prudential framework of financial markets. Those 
propositions result in an open-minded 5-S efficiency paradigm that could replace the free 
markets efficiency belief in favor of societal efficiency in order to cope with crisis-
provoking capitalist finance evolution and its destructive consequences. Therefore it is 
obvious that the redesign of the regulatory framework is more than a simple intellectual 
matter of debate and requires strong voluntarist policies to direct financial markets 
towards positive supportive role in economic evolution. Financial stability depends 
mainly on the capacity of consistent organization of the financial system with regard to 
monetary and financial imbalances coming from behavior and expectations of diverse 
participants before they are transformed into a systemic crisis. It then seems to be 
obvious that macro-prudential regulation based principles must be substituted to micro-
regulation schemas to address systemic instability issues and take into account counter-
cyclical and systemic needs to stabilize the whole economy. That calls for modifications 
in the institutional structure of financial markets. Stronger macro-prudential regulation 
framework must be designed instead of market-friendly micro-prudential regulation 
and must aim at preventing short-sighted speculative activities and broadening sound 
finance to sustain productive activities. Minsky wisely maintains that “For the viability of 
economic relations, we have to imagine a good financial society in which the tendency 
by business and banks to engage in speculative finance is constrained” (1982: 69).  
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